Tag: judicial review
-
Taiwan Constitutional Court’s Solomonic Judgment: Upholding the Constitutionality of Death Penalty at the Limits of Reform
—Ming-Sung Kuo, Reader in Law, University of Warwick (UK), and Hui-Wen Chen, Research Assistant, University of Warwick (UK) Introduction: The Reform Jurisprudence Comes Full Circle? Before the current Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) under the leadership of Chief Justice Tzong-Li HSU – call it Hsu’s Court – hit its halfway milestone, we argued in this space…
-
The Role of a Judge in an Electoral Autocracy
—Aparna Chandra, Associate Professor of Law and M. K. Nambyar Chair Professor on Constitutional Law, National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. [Editor’s Note: This is one of our ICONnect columns. For more on our 2024 columnists, see here.] The Autocrats’ Playbook This is the year of elections.
-
Will the Netherlands Finally Embrace Constitutional Adjudication?
—Maartje De Visser, Singapore Management University, Yong Pung How School of Law [Editor’s Note: This is one of our biweekly ICONnect columns. For more information on our 2022 columnists, see here.] On 1 July 2022, the Dutch government, acting through its ministers for the Interior and Legal Protection, sent a letter to parliament announcing its…
-
From the Least Dangerous Branch of Government to the Most Democratically Disruptive Court in the World
—Miguel Schor, Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Drake University Constitutional Law Center In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the United States Supreme Court is the least dangerous of the three branches of government as it lacks the power of the President or Congress.
-
Comparative Constitutional Law Theory Today Depends Upon Back-Translators
—Bryan Dennis G. Tiojanco, Project Associate Professor, University of Tokyo, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics. Twitter: @botiojanco [Editor’s Note: This is one of our ICONnect columns. For more on our 2022 columnists, see here.] ‘How to Save a Constitutional Democracy’, the title of Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq’s 2018 book, perfectly captures the gist…
-
Transnational Elite Self-Empowerment and Judicial Supremacy
—Cristina E. Parau, Oxford University [Editor’s Note: This is a reply to Conor Gearty’s recent review of Dr. Parau’s Transnational Networks and Elite Self-Empowerment: The Making of the Judiciary in Contemporary Europe and Beyond (OUP 2018).] This note is in reply to a review of my monograph Transnational Networks and Elite Self-Empowerment: The Making of the…
-
Shortcuts and Short Circuits in Latin American Constitutional Models: a Reading of Cristina Lafont’s Democracy without Shortcuts
—Julian Gaviria-Mira, Universidad EAFIT, Colombia In Democracy without Shortcuts, the philosopher Cristina Lafont has elaborated a compelling defense of what she calls a “deliberative-participatory democracy”. This democracy “without shortcuts” seeks to vindicate, at the same time, both deliberation in democratic institutions and strong participation of the citizens in collective self-government.
-
Taking Constitutional Statecraft Beyond the Courts – a Book Review of Yvonne Tew’s “Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts”
[Editor’s Note: In this installment of I•CONnect’s Book Review Series, Ming-Sung Kuo reviews Yvonne Tew’s book on Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts (Oxford University Press, 2020)] — Ming-Sung Kuo, Associate Professor, University of Warwick, UK National experiences in Asia have abundantly enriched the gene pool of comparative constitutional law thanks to great efforts of scholars from…
-
The Colombian Model of Judicial Review of Legislation: A Predecessor to the Austrian Constitutional Court of 1920
—Mario Alberto Cajas Sarria, Universidad Icesi, Colombia[1] It is 100 years since the creation of the Austrian Constitutional Court (October, 1920), which gave rise to the “Austrian Model” of judicial review of a concentrated and specialized Constitutional Court,[2] that spread across Europe with its adaptations and migrated to other continents[3].
-
Special Undergraduate Series–COVID-19: The Indian Supreme Court’s Abdication of Constitutional Duty
Special Series: Perspectives from Undergraduate Law StudentsLL.B. Student Contribution —Prannv Dhawan, National Law School of India University, and Anmol Jain, National Law University, Jodhpur Judicial restraint is necessary in dealing with the powers of another co-ordinate bench of the government; but restraint cannot imply abdication of the responsibility of walking on that edge.